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1 Introduction
When a good is sold through a network, one of the important questions to be answered is whether
locationally diﬀerentiated prices or a uniform market price should be charged. Locationally diﬀer-
entiated market prices take potential network congestion directly into account. A uniform market
price, however, ‘enlarges’ the market (by ignoring congestion), but makes a mechanism outside
the market necessary to alleviate potential congestion. A prominent example for such a prob-
lem is given by the management of transmission capacity in liberalized electricity markets. In the
U.S., seven regional electricity markets have implemented locational marginal pricing, where prices
can diﬀer among locations in the same market and thus, implicitly price transmission constraints
directly at the spot market.1 In contrast, most European electricity markets continue to use re-
dispatch systems, where a single price per market exists and transmission constraints are solved
by the system operator after the spot market has taken place. However, intense debates about
shifting towards locational marginal pricing are ongoing in the U.K., Germany as well as at the
wider European level.2
Many contributions have extensively analyzed the impact of diﬀerent transmission management
regimes.3 However, all these articles typically focus on short run market performance, leaving aside
long run aspects such as investment incentives in transmission and generation facilities. Recently,
experts as well as policy makers have increasingly emphasized that for the proper functioning
of electricity markets not only short run eﬃciency but also long run incentives are of central
importance.4 Moreover, a detailed analysis of the long run perspective seems to be of particular
importance in the light of the ongoing debate on insuﬃcient incentives in liberalized electricity
markets to provide generation investment.5 Till date this debate has entirely abstracted from
issues arising due to a transmission network.
This paper sheds light on the relationship between transmission management and long term in-
vestment in generation and transmission capacity. Thus, we develop a network model with endoge-
nous generation and transmission capacities. Competitive firms invest in two diﬀerent generation
technologies, which allows production at diﬀerent levels of demand. Transmission investment is
assumed to be optimal, anticipating subsequent generation investment. The capacity of the trans-
mission line limits the amount of physical trade that can take place. As transmission constraints
1For a description of the regional electricity markets in the U.S. compare, e.g., http://www.ferc.gov/.
2Compare, e.g., Ofgem (2010) and Redpoint Energy (2011) for the British discussion, Frontier (2011) for the
discussion in Germany and European Parliament (2009), European Council (2011), Acer (2011) and Electricity
Regulatory Forum (2011) for eﬀorts on the European level.
3Compare Joskow and Tirole (2000) and Gilbert, Neuhoﬀ and Newbery (2004) who analyze the eﬀect of diﬀerent
transmission allocation mechanisms on generation spot market conduct and Green (2007) who estimates the short
run welfare loss due to sequential market clearing compared to simultaneous market clearing.
4Compare, e.g., Baldick, Bushnell, Hobbs and Wolak (2011) for an expert opinion and European Parliament
(2009) for a policy viewpoint.
5See, e.g., Oren(2005), Hogan (2005), Cramton and Stoft (2006), Joskow (2007) or Cramton and Ockenfels (2011)
on the ‘missing money discussion’.
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might potentially exist in this network, a mechanism for transmission allocation is needed. We
investigate two diﬀerent, frequently applied mechanisms for transmission allocation: Simultaneous
market clearing and sequential market clearing. Our benchmark case is given by simultaneous
market clearing (‘locational marginal pricing’), where separate spot market prices exist at the
diﬀerent nodes in the network. Whenever the level of demand and hence, the amount of trade is
high, such that a transmission line is constrained, the spot market prices depart from each other.
This leads to an eﬃcient allocation and the spot market is directly cleared. With sequential market
clearing (‘redispatch system’), a single spot market price exists in the whole network. Whenever
the level of demand is high, such that the transmission line is constrained, the spot market outcome
becomes physically infeasible. In order to achieve market clearing, an adjustment market has to
be run, where the system operator engages in counter-trading. That is, the system operator acts
as a seller at the exporting side of the constrained line and as a buyer at the importing side of the
constrained line. These additional transactions reduce the level of trade between the two nodes to
a physically feasible level.6
First, our benchmark case with simultaneous market clearing produces the socially optimal invest-
ment outcome.7 Simultaneous market clearing ensures that generation is priced at its locational
marginal value. This gives competitive firms the eﬃcient price signals for generation investment
and hence, given the optimal generation capacity, transmission investment is also conducted eﬃ-
ciently.
Second, sequential market clearing, on the other hand, leads to overinvestment in total generation
and transmission capacity. Sequential market clearing disentangles the price signal from the loca-
tion of production and hence, from its locational marginal value. This leads to higher generation
scarcity rents and therefore, to exaggerated investment incentives in generation. As we show, the
transmission capacity matches the generation capacity. Thus, there is also overinvestment in the
corresponding transmission line.
Finally, we find that with simultaneous market clearing the socially optimal technology mix is
reached. In contrast, with sequential market clearing the technology mix is distorted towards
more peakload and less baseload generation capacity.
The central message of our findings is that policy makers should be aware that switching from
a system of sequential market clearing to a system of simultaneous market clearing leads to a
reduction of investment incentives. In a setting like ours, that is, without any market distortions,
this is desirable as it leads to the socially optimal investment outcome. However, if investment
incentives in a specific market are already perceived as too low, a change of the transmission man-
6The expressions counter-trading and (market-based) redispatch are used interchangeably in this article. Both
expressions describe methods to alleviate transmission congestion outside the spot market. Under both methods,
the system operator makes market transactions against the ‘direction’ of trade at the spot market in order to reduce
the traded quantity over the transmission line until the congestion is eliminated.
7This result is in line with the previous literature on locational marginal pricing (see Hogan, 1999).
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agement regime might then further aggravate these problems. Inadequate investment incentives
might be a result of market imperfections and institutional constraints in electricity markets, such
as price caps, which suppress electricity prices below the eﬃcient level. Hence, generation rev-
enues might be insuﬃcient to provide adequate generation capacity (compare the ‘missing money
discussion’, e.g., Oren, 2005, Hogan, 2005, Cramton and Stoft, 2006, Joskow, 2007, and Cramton
and Ockenfels, 2011). Policy makers should then be aware of the potentially increased necessity
to adopt appropriate measures to enhance firms’ investment activities. However, in this paper we
abstract from any of these market imperfections. Notice that our results should not be understood
as a justification for the introduction or the retention of sequential market clearing as a proper
mechanism to enhance firms’ investment activity in a specific electricity market.
This work is related to the literature on the regulation of electricity transmission. Bushnell (1999),
Joskow and Tirole (2000), and Gilbert, Neuhoﬀ and Newbery (2004) analyze diﬀerent transmission
capacity allocation methods and how these aﬀect the spot market outcomes in markets with
simultaneous market clearing. Wolak (2011) measures the benefits from introducing simultaneous
market clearing in the Californian electricity market and Green (2007) calculates the welfare loss
associated with sequential market clearing relative to simultaneous market clearing in England and
Wales. However, these articles do not take any long term aspects like investment in generation
or transmission capacities into account. Another strand in the literature explicitly considers the
impact of diﬀerent regulatory measures on transmission investment. Léautier (2000), Vogelsang
(2001), Bushnell and Stoft (1997), Hogan (1992), Joskow and Tirole (2005), Sauma and Oren
(2009), and Hogan, Rosellón and Vogelsang (2010) analyze diﬀerent regulatory instruments to
incentivize transmission investment. As compared to our work, however, these articles do not
consider the impact of diﬀerent transmission management systems. Moreover, we also analyze
a potential change in the generation stock.8 To the best of our knowledge, this article is the
first one to derive the impact of the transmission management system on investment incentives in
generation and transmission facilities.
Last but not least, this article is related to the peak load pricing literature, that has investi-
gated generation investment incentives under fluctuating and potentially uncertain demand and
emphasized the eﬀect of the spot market design. A good overview of the literature is provided
by Crew, Fernando and Kleindorfer (1995). Boom (2009) and Fabra, von der Fehr and de Frutos
(2011) analyze the eﬀect of auctions at the spot market. Reynolds and Wilson (2000) and Fabra
and de Frutos (2011) analyze the case of Bertrand spot markets. Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997),
Murphy and Smeers (2005), and Zöttl (2011) analyze strategic investment prior to Cournot com-
petition. All these contributions completely abstract from the problems implied by the presence
8Our work explicitely considers investment in transmission and generation. Sauma and Oren (2006) show in
their paper that analyzing transmission investment, taking the generation capacity in the market as given, leads to
significantly distorted predictions. Rious, Glachant and Dessante (2010) extend the analysis by Sauma and Oren
by assuming that anticipation is costly.
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of a transmission network.
In the next Section we present our model. In Section 3 we analyze simultaneous market clearing.
In Section 4 we analyze sequential market clearing and compare the results. In Section 5 we relate
our work to the current discussion on transmission management in the electricity sector. In Section
6 we discuss an extension and generalize our results in a n-node network. In Section 7 we put
forward some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a network as described in Figure 1 where consumption takes place at a ‘demand
node’, denoted by D, and production takes place at a ‘supply node’, denoted by S. Both nodes are
connected via a transmission line. Trade between consumers at the demand node and producers
at the supply node is limited by the transmission line’s capacity L.
Figure 1: Two-node network
Competitive firms at the supply node can invest in production capacity. This allows these firms to
produce at a spot market with variable levels of demand at the demand node. Production takes
place given the constraints by transmission and generation capacities. Inverse demand is given by
the function P (Q, ✓), which depends on output Q 2 R+ with PQ (.) < 0, and the variable ✓ 2 R
which captures the diﬀerent levels of demand. The frequencies of all diﬀerent levels of demand
are denoted by f(✓), their support is given by [✓, ✓] and their cumulative distribution is denoted
by F (✓).9 We normalize F (✓) such that F (✓) = 0 and F (✓) = 1. Throughout the article we will
refer to the diﬀerent levels ✓ of spot market demand simply as to ‘spot market ✓’.10 The firms are
assumed to be price takers and the spot market is perfectly competitive.
We analyze the case of two diﬀerent production technologies, which are available at the supply
node, a ‘baseload’ production technology and a ‘peakload’ production technology. The baseload
9✓ can be interpreted as a parameter representing the electricity demand in a particular hour. Accordingly, F (✓)
can be interpreted as the probability distribution over all demand realization within the 8760 hours in a year.
10Notice that at the time of investment firms do not necessarily need to know the demand levels at all spot
markets. In order to keep notation to a minimum, we do not explicitly disentangle demand fluctuations occurring
at spot markets in several periods from uncertainty regarding the precise pattern of those fluctuations. Notice,
however, that the parameter ✓✏[✓, ✓] of our model is suited to capture both phenomena.
The demand fluctuations are central to our analysis, as only then the diﬀerent market clearing mechanisms begin
to matter. An analysis without demand fluctuations would thus not generate any useful insights for the design
of liberalized electricity markets. We discuss the implications stemming from the demand fluctuations in detail in
section 4.
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(peakload) technology comes with production cost c1 (c) and the cost of capacity investment is
given by k1 (k), with c1 < c and k1 > k.11 We denote the equilibrium industry investment by
(X,X1), where X represents total investment and X1 represents baseload investment. Peakload
investment is given by the diﬀerence of total and baseload investment (X  X1).
Investment in the transmission line investment is taking place optimally, given subsequent gener-
ation investment. A natural as well as realistic interpretation of this assumption would be that
transmission line investment is determined by a welfare maximizing regulator. The transmission
line is assumed to be operated by a (independent) system operator. The nominal line size is de-
noted by L and the marginal cost of investment in the transmission line by t. For the main part
of this paper we assume that investment in additional transmission capacity is less costly than
investment in peakload capacity, that is, t < k. This reflects the situation in the electricity sector,
where transmission expansion is considerably cheaper than generation expansion.12 In section 6
we relax this assumption in order to discuss its relevance for our results. Generators know their
production capacities, the nominal line capacity as well as the spot market demand at the time
of making their production decision. Hence, produced quantities are contingent on the demand
scenarios ✓ 2 [✓, ✓]. However, the exact transmission capacity is only known after spot market pro-
duction decisions have been made. This assumption is needed in order to establish an equilibrium.
We abstract from any cost of transmission operation like line losses or other system services.
We consider two diﬀerent mechanisms for transmission management in this paper. Under simul-
taneous market clearing the operation of the network is governed by a system of optimal nodal
prices, that is, a price at the supply node and a price at the demand node. These nodal prices
adjust in such a way that the market is always cleared. If transmission capacity is abundant, trade
between the two nodes leads to identical prices at both nodes. However, if transmission capacity
is scarce, trade between the two nodes is restricted and prices at the two nodes depart. At the
demand node a high price occurs, while at the supply node competition among generators leads to
a low price. The price diﬀerences between the two nodes in the case of a congested transmission
line (‘congestion rents’) can be used by the regulator to finance transmission investment.
Under sequential market clearing the operation of the network is governed by a single spot market
price in the whole network. In case the transmission capacity is scarce, trade at the spot market
takes place as if no congestion occurs, though this might lead to physically infeasible spot market
outcomes. After the spot market has taken place and the de facto transmission capacities are
11In the case of the electricity sector, nuclear-, lignite-, coal-, and gas-fired power plants are usually used by
energy companies. Nuclear power plants have very high investment costs but a low cost of production, while gas-
fired power plants have relatively low investment cost and a high cost of reduction. Hence, nuclear power plants
can be interpreted as baseload plants and gas-fired power plants as peakload plants. Lignite- and coal-fired power
plants have a cost structure that locates them somewhere in between nuclear- and gas-fired plants. Notice that if a
technology with low (high) production and low (high) investment costs would be available, a corner solution would
arise, where this technology would be the only technology in the market or it would not be used at all.
12An overview of investment costs for diﬀerent generation and transmission technologies can be found in Schaber,
Steinke and Hamacher (2012).
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realized, the system operator assures whether or not the spot market outcome is feasible, that is,
production is not larger than transmission capacity. If this is not the case, the system operator runs
an adjustment market. In this market the system operator engages as a seller at the demand node
and as a buyer at the supply node, such that the production volume just matches the transmission
capacity. Notice that in the adjustment market the price at the demand node always lies above
the price at the supply node. Hence, it is costly for the system operator to run the adjustment
market. The adjustment market as well as transmission investment are financed via a transmission
fee raised from the generators.
The timing is as follows: 1.) The optimal transmission investment decision is made. 2.) Generators
decide upon generation capacity investments. 3.) The system operator runs the spot market: (i)
Spot market realization ✓ is determined. (ii) Generators set production quantities. (iii) Trans-
mission line uncertainty is revealed. (iv) If necessary, in a system with sequential market clearing,
the system operator runs the adjustment market.
3 Simultaneous Market Clearing
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of a spot market design with simultaneous market clearing
on industry investment in generation capacity and the optimal transmission capacity investment.
With simultaneous market clearing, spot market prices at the two nodes in the network depart
from each other when the transmission line is constrained. This system allows to directly take
transmission constraints into account at the spot market.
In order to understand the concept of simultaneous market clearing, we provide a short description
of the spot market: For given generation and transmission capacities, competitive generators
want to produce until marginal cost equals the market price. The marginal cost is either given
by the characteristics of the baseload or the peakload production units. Moreover, generators
are constrained by their capacity in their production decision. The latter is denoted by Q0 (✓).
Demand is restricted by the transmission capacity L, which is needed to transport the electricity
from the supply to the demand node. As long as the transmission capacity exceeds the generation
production decision (Q0 (✓) < L) trade takes place without limitations. However, if the generation
production decision exceeds the transmission capacity (Q0 (✓) > L) the price at the demand node
rises above the price at the supply node, which is kept down at marginal cost through competition
among generators.
In order to be able to establish an equilibrium under simultaneous market clearing a small technical
assumption has to be made. When the production decision equals the transmission capacity
(Q0 (✓) = L) an arbitrarily small amount of uncertainty for the overall size of transmission is
needed. The transmission line is subject to some uncertainty, that is, the de facto transmission
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capacity, denoted by T , is slightly diﬀerent from the nominal line size and given by T = L + ".13
The support [ ✏,+✏] of the random shock " can be deliberately small (i.e., ✏! 0). We denote the
density of T by g (T ) and its distribution by G (T ). For simplicity, if |L Q0 (✓)| < " holds, we
refer to Q0 (✓) = L in the remainder of this paper. This implies that peakload generation units can
only earn positive scarcity rents, if the de facto line capacity exceeds the total generation capacity
(T   X).
The following lemma characterizes investment under a system with simultaneous market clearing.
Lemma 1 [Generation and Transmission Investment - Simultaneous Market Clearing] Under a
system with simultaneous market clearing, industry investment in generation
⇣
Xˆ, Xˆ1
⌘
is uniquely
characterized by
Xˆ :
(⇣
1 G
⇣
Xˆ   Lˆ
⌘⌘ ˆ ✓¯
✓X
⇣
P
⇣
Xˆ, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓) = k
)
Xˆ1 :
(ˆ ✓X1
✓X1
⇣
P
⇣
Xˆ1, ✓
⌘
  c1
⌘
dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓¯
✓X1
(c  c1) dF (✓) = k1   k
)
The optimal line
⇣
Lˆ = Xˆ
⌘
, given industry investment, is uniquely characterized by
Lˆ :
(
G
⇣
Xˆ   Lˆ
⌘ ˆ ✓¯
✓X
⇣
P
⇣
Lˆ, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓) = t
)
.
✓X1 is the spot market scenario beyond which baseload investment is binding, ✓X1 is the spot market
scenario beyond which firms produce at the marginal cost of the peak load technology c and ✓X is
the spot market scenario beyond which total investment is binding.
Proof. See Appendix.
The critical spot market scenarios are illustrated in graph (a) of Figure 2. Notice that ✓X1 , ✓X1
and ✓X are defined by the respective spot market conditions, that is: At ✓X1 and quantity X1
marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of baseload production c1. At ✓X1 and quantity X1
marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of peakload production c. At ✓X and quantity X
marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost of peakload production c.
13Notice that this assumption is in line with the technical properties of electricity transmission. De facto trans-
mission capacities usually depend on environmental conditions and operational actions in the transmission network.
For example, ‘the import capacity of Path 15 (connecting Northern and Southern California) varies between about
2600 MW and 3950 MW depending upon the ambient temperature and remedial action schemes that are in place
to respond to unanticipated outages of generating plants and transmission lines.’ (see Joskow and Tirole (2005),
fn. 20)
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Figure 2: Illustration of the critical spot market scenarios for given investment decisions (X,X1, L),
with X = L. (a) critical spot market scenarios in the absence of a transmission fee ⌧ . (b) critical
spot market scenarios when a transmission fee ⌧ exists.
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The characterization of the investment outcome in the lemma is rather intuitive.
First, generation and transmission capacity are of equal size
⇣
Xˆ = Lˆ
⌘
: The optimal transmission
line capacity does not exceed the generation capacity built by investors
⇣
Lˆ  Xˆ
⌘
as capacity is
costly and the exceeding capacity would never be utilized. In addition, peakload generators can
only earn positive scarcity rents at the spot market, when they constitute the constraining element
in the market
⇣
Xˆ  Tˆ
⌘
. Hence, generation capacity does not exceed the transmission capacity⇣
Xˆ  Lˆ
⌘
. As neither generation nor transmission capacity is larger than the other in equilibrium,
it has to hold that both are of equal size
⇣
Xˆ = Lˆ
⌘
.
Second, consider total generation capacity. In equilibrium, the scarcity rents earned by generators
beyond spot market ✓X , when the transmission line is not congested, are equal to the marginal cost
of investment k. As the nominal transmission capacity Lˆ diﬀers from the de facto transmission
capacity, that is, Tˆ = Lˆ+ ", the transmission line is uncongested with probability 1 G
⇣
Xˆ   Lˆ
⌘
.
Notice that investment in generation capacity is solely determined by the peakload generation
characteristics. Due to the higher production cost, the peakload generation units are employed
in the spot market only after baseload generation units have been fully utilized, that is, beyond
demand realization ✓X1 . Hence, the characteristics of these ‘marginally’ employed generation units
are decisive for total capacity investment. Additional capacity is only valuable at the marginal
demand levels, when capacity is scarce, that is, beyond demand realization ✓X , when total capacity
is met and the spot market price rises above the peakload production cost c.
Third, consider transmission capacity. In equilibrium, the marginal value of transmission capacity,
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namely, the scarcity rents when the transmission line is congested beyond spot market ✓X , is
equal to the marginal cost of investment t. Congestion only occurs beyond spot market ✓X with
probability G
⇣
Xˆ   Lˆ
⌘
. Notice that the price diﬀerences occurring between the supply and the
demand node just equal the transmission investment costs. Hence, no additional revenue for
financing the transmission line is necessary and no extra transmission fee is needed. The identical
result can also arise as the outcome in a transmission merchant investment model, where financial
transmission rights are issued to investors to determine and finance the transmission capacity (see
also Joskow and Tirole (2005)).
Fourth, the most intuitive way to describe baseload capacity investment Xˆ1 is as a replacement
trade-oﬀ. Replacing a unit of baseload generation with a unit of peakload generation causes higher
investment costs by k1   k as the former is more expensive to build than the latter. However, the
baseload unit has cheaper production costs. Therefore, at all spot markets when peakload gener-
ation is used, that is, beyond ✓X1 , substituting peakload with baseload generation creates a gain
equal to the diﬀerence in production cost c  c1. Moreover, the baseload unit is already profitable
to run at lower spot markets as the peakload unit, that is, before ✓X1 , and earns additional scarcity
rents whenever baseload capacity is constrained but peakload generation is not profitable to run
yet, that is, at all spot markets ✓✏
h
✓X1 , ✓X1
i
.
The following remark compares the investment performance under simultaneous market clearing
with the socially optimal investment outcome which is denoted by (X⇤, X⇤1 , L⇤).
Remark 1 [Generation and Transmission Investment - Simultaneous Market Clearing] The solu-
tion obtained under a system with simultaneous market clearing gives rise to the socially optimal
investment, in total generation investment
⇣
Xˆ = X⇤
⌘
, in the baseload technology
⇣
Xˆ1 = X⇤1
⌘
as
well as in the transmission line
⇣
Lˆ = L⇤
⌘
.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is in line with the previous literature on locational marginal pricing (see, e.g., Hogan
(1999) or Joskow and Tirole (2005)). Since generation investors behave perfectly competitive,
firms invest in additional generation capacity up to the point when the generation scarcity rents
equal the investment cost and the marginal profit from investment is zero. With simultaneous
market clearing, these scarcity rents at each spot market realization just reflect the locational
marginal value of generation at each node and provide the eﬃcient signal for investment. Hence,
the generation investment outcome corresponds to the socially optimal solution.
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4 Sequential Market Clearing
This section analyzes industry investment in generation capacity and optimal investment in trans-
mission capacity under sequential market clearing. Subsequently, we compare the outcome to the
results from section 3. With sequential market clearing only a single spot market price for the
whole network exists. This single spot market price is insuﬃcient to take transmission constraints
into account and might lead to infeasible spot market outcomes. Therefore, if necessary, the system
operator runs an adjustment market to finally achieve market clearing after the spot market has
taken place and when the actual transmission capacity is known.
In order to understand the concept of sequential market clearing, we provide a short description of
the spot market: For given capacities, competitive generators want to produce until marginal cost
equals the market price. The marginal cost is either given by the characteristics of the baseload
or the peakload production units. The resulting spot market production decision, denoted by
Q’ (✓), is constrained by the generators capacity. Moreover, trade is physically restricted by the de
facto transmission capacity T . However, with sequential market clearing, trade at the spot market
takes place as if this transmission constraint did not exist. That is, the generators’ production
decision at the spot market might even exceed the transmission capacity (Q’ (✓) > T ). Yet, such
a spot market outcome is physically infeasible. In order to ensure market clearing in this case,
the system operator runs an adjustment market after the spot market has taken place. At the
adjustment market, the system operator engages as a buyer of the ‘exceeding’ quantity Q’ (✓)  T
at the demand node and as a seller of equal quantity at the supply node, such that the market
outcome becomes feasible. This produces prices at the adjustment market, which are equal to
the spot market prices at the diﬀerent nodes with simultaneous market clearing, though the trade
volume at the adjustment market is less. Notice that in contrast to simultaneous market clearing,
where revenues are generated through the price diﬀerences, running a market with sequential
market clearing is costly. The reason is that the system operator has to engage as a buyer at the
‘expensive’ demand node and as a seller at the ‘inexpensive’ supply node.
The following lemma characterizes investment in generation and transmission under a system with
sequential market clearing.
Lemma 2 [Generation and Transmission Investment - Sequential Market Clearing] Under a sys-
tem with sequential market clearing, industry investment in generation
⇣
X˜, X˜1
⌘
is uniquely char-
acterized by
X˜ :
(ˆ ✓¯
✓X⌧
⇣
P
⇣
X˜, ✓
⌘
  ⌧   c
⌘
dF (✓) = k
)
X˜1 :
(ˆ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
⇣
P
⇣
X˜1, ✓
⌘
  ⌧   c1
⌘
dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓¯
✓
X1
⌧
(c  c1) dF (✓) = k1   k
)
.
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The optimal line
⇣
L˜ = X˜
⌘
, given industry investment, is uniquely characterized by
L˜ :
(ˆ ✓¯
✓L⌧
⇣
P
⇣
L˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)   t
)
.
⌧ is a transmission fee the regulator charges in order to compensate the transmission investment
expenses. ✓X1⌧ is the spot market scenario beyond which baseload investment is binding, ✓X1⌧ is the
spot market scenario beyond which firms produce at the marginal cost of the peak load technology c,
✓X⌧ is the spot market scenario beyond which total investment is binding and ✓L⌧ is the spot market
scenario beyond which the transmission capacity is binding.
Proof. See Appendix.
The critical spot market scenarios are illustrated in graph (b) of Figure 2. ✓X1⌧ , ✓X1⌧ , ✓X⌧ and ✓L⌧
are defined by the respective spot market conditions, that is: At ✓X1⌧ and quantity X1 marginal
revenue is equal to the marginal cost of baseload production plus the transmission fee, c1 + ⌧ .
At ✓X1⌧ and quantity X1 marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost of peakload production
plus the transmission fee, c+ ⌧ . At ✓X⌧ and quantity X marginal revenue is equal to the marginal
cost of peakload production c plus the transmission fee, c + ⌧ . Again, the characterization of the
investment outcome in the lemma is rather intuitive. We discuss the investment outcome in detail
in the following paragraphs.
First, generation capacity is built as if transmission constraints did not exist. In equilibrium the
total generation scarcity rents, that is, beyond spot market realization ✓X⌧ , are equal to the peakload
generation investment cost k, regardless of potential transmission congestion. However, notice
that the generation scarcity rents are reduced by the transmission fee ⌧ . As the transmission fee
increases the generators’ perceived production cost above the actual production cost, the generators
produce less quantity at all spot markets when capacity constraints are not met and capacity
constraints are only reached at higher spot markets. That is, generators earn scarcity rents only at
spot markets beyond ✓X⌧ . An illustration of these distortions can be found in graph (b) of Figure
2.
Second, consider transmission capacity. In equilibrium, the marginal value of transmission capacity
is equal to the marginal cost of investment t. Notice that, as generation investment takes place
regardless of the existence of suﬃcient transmission capacity, the marginal value of transmission
capacity is equal to the full scarcity rents beyond spot market ✓L⌧ for L˜  X˜. Furthermore, since
t < k, the marginal value of transmission capacity is larger than the marginal revenue of generation
capacity. Hence, the optimal transmission capacity is never smaller than the generation capacity.
As the optimal transmission capacity also never exceeds the generation capacity, the transmission
capacity again just matches the generation capacity
⇣
L˜ = X˜
⌘
. Finally, observe that since L˜ = X˜
there is no trading volume at the adjustment market and no extra cost for running the adjustment
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market occurs.
Third, the baseload generation investment outcome can again be best understood in a replacement
context as in Section 3, under simultaneous market clearing. Replacing a peakload by a baseload
generation unit causes higher investment costs. However, it also decreases the production cost,
whenever it is profitable for a peakload unit to produce. Moreover, production becomes profitable
at spot market realizations, when peakload units would still be unprofitable to run.
Now we can state our main result, which compares investment under sequential market clearing
with investment under simultaneous market clearing.
Proposition 1 [Generation and Transmission Investment] If demand is inelastic, | ⌘ | 1, the
solution obtained under a system with sequential market clearing gives rise to
(i) higher investment in total generation capacity
⇣
X˜ > Xˆ
⌘
,
(ii) lower investment in baseload capacity
⇣
X˜1 < Xˆ1
⌘
and
(iii) higher investment in total transmission capacity
⇣
L˜ > Lˆ
⌘
compared to investment under a system with simultaneous market clearing.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us provide an intuition for this result. Regardless of the specific market design, the cost of
transmission investment has to be fully recouped from the market participants. Under simultane-
ous market clearing, the transmission congestion rents are suﬃcient for financing the transmission
line. These price diﬀerences only occur at the ‘marginal’ spot markets, that is, beyond ✓X , when
generators potentially earn scarcity rents which determine the generation capacity. Under sequen-
tial market clearing, no such price diﬀerences occur. A linear transmission fee is levied on the
generators’ usage of the transmission line at all spot market realizations. This implies that the
cost of transmission investment is partly recouped at the ‘inframarginal’ spot market realizations,
that is, before ✓X⌧ , which are irrelevant for the investment decision. Therefore, the transmission fee
is lower than it would be if it was only collected at the marginal spot market realizations. Thus,
the transmission fee is also lower at all spot market realizations beyond ✓X⌧ , and consequently, the
scarcity rents earned by generators’ are larger compared to a system with simultaneous market
clearing. With larger scarcity rents, investment becomes more profitable and more generation
capacity is built.
However, notice that the spot market distortions caused through the transmission fee have the
reverse eﬀect on investment. Hence, the result in Proposition 1 only holds if demand is inelastic
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(|⌘|  1). Most studies find price elasticities of demand in the electricity sector of 0.1   0.5 in
the short run and 0.3   0.7 in the long run. See, e.g., Lijsen (2006) for an overview of recent
contributions on that issue. This implies that the introduction of the transmission fee does not
cause too severe spot market distortions. That is, the spot market quantities are not distorted too
much, and hence, the critical spot market realizations are not too diﬀerent from those without a
transmission fee.
The result for baseload investment is contrary to that for total investment. Under simultaneous
market clearing, firms’ replacement decisions are independent of the level of transmission capacity
(as long as we have an interior solution with positive peakload investment). Hence, the replace-
ment decision is independent of the cost of the transmission line. In principle, this also obtains
under sequential market clearing, that is, the transmission fee ⌧ has no impact on the replacement
decision. An exception is given, however, by those spot market realizations, where baseload is
binding, as scarcity rents in those cases are reduced. In total, this leads to lower baseload in-
vestment compared to simultaneous market clearing. Eventually, as the transmission capacity just
matches the generation capacity, the transmission capacity is also larger compared to simultaneous
market clearing.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the assumption on fluctuating demand is central for our results.
Only then the diﬀerent market clearing mechanisms begin to matter. As explained in this section,
investment diﬀers between sequential and simultaneous market clearing, as the generation scarcity
rents are diﬀerent. This is due to the fact that under sequential market clearing the cost of trans-
mission investment is partly recouped at the ‘inframarginal’ spot market realizations before ✓X⌧ .
Hence, the transmission fee is lower at all spot market realizations beyond ✓X⌧ , and consequently,
the scarcity rents earned by generators are larger compared to a system with simultaneous market
clearing. Without demand fluctuations, this distinction could not be made, as only a single spot
market realization exists. An analysis without demand fluctuations would thus not generate any
useful insight on the impact of diﬀerent transmission management regimes on firms’ investment
incentives as analyzed in the present framework.
5 Policy Implications
The allocation of scarce transmission capacity in electricity markets is an intensely debated topic.
In the U.S., seven regional electricity markets have introduced simultaneous market clearing: The
PJM electricity market in 1998, the New York (NYISO) market in 1999, the New England market
(ISO-NE) in 2003, the Midwest market (MISO) in 2005, the California market (CAISO) and the
Southwest Power Pool (SPP) in 2007 and the Texas market (ERCOT) in 2010.14 In contrast,
14Compare also, e.g., O’Neill et al., (2006), (2008).
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most European electricity markets continue to use sequential market clearing. To this date, si-
multaneous market clearing has only been introduced in the Polish electricity market in 2011.
However, the rapid and regionally concentrated increase in new and low-carbon generation as well
as the retirement of old generation in Europe puts pressure on the existing transmission grid. This
creates the need for eﬃcient transmission management.15 This development has led to intense
debates about shifting towards simultaneous market clearing in the U.K. as well as in Germany.
The British electricity regulator Ofgem is currently reviewing the electricity transmission charg-
ing arrangements as part of its ‘Project TransmiT’ (compare Ofgem, 2010, and Redpoint Energy,
2011). The German electricity regulator Bundesnetzagentur has recently commissioned a study on
the introduction of locational pricing (see Frontier, 2011). Moreover, the debate in Germany has
gained pace after the decision in 2011 to phase out nuclear power, which has put the transmission
grid under pressure (see Bundesnetzagentur, 2011). Also, the European authorities exert strong
pressure towards an approach using locational pricing between regional markets on the European
level. Transmission congestion management is seen as a key element in the eﬀorts by the Eu-
ropean Commission to establish a fully functioning electricity market in Europe until 2014 (see,
e.g., European Parliament, 2009, and European Council, 2011). For this purpose the European
energy regulator Acer has developed ‘Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Conges-
tion Management for Electricity’ (see Acer (2011)) and the so called Electricity Regulatory Forum,
which was established by the European Commission to promote an internal market for energy, has
proposed a ‘Target Model for Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management’ (see Electricity
Regulatory Forum, 2011).16
Many contributions have extensively analyzed the impact of the diﬀerent transmission management
regimes. Compare, e.g., Joskow and Tirole (2000) and Gilbert, Neuhoﬀ and Newbery (2004)
who analyze the eﬀect of diﬀerent transmission allocation mechanisms on generation spot market
conduct. Moreover, Wolak (2011) and Green (2007) estimate the short run welfare loss due to non-
locational pricing in California resp. England and Wales. However, all these articles typically focus
on short run spot market conduct, leaving aside long run aspects such as investment incentives
in transmission and generation facilities. Recently, experts17 as well as policy makers18 have
increasingly emphasized that for the proper functioning of electricity markets not only short run
eﬃciency, but also long run incentives are of central importance. Moreover, a detailed analysis of
the long run perspective seems to be of particular importance in the light of the ongoing debate on
15Neuhoﬀ et al. (2011a) and Neuhoﬀ et al. (2011b) show that the introduction of simultaneous market clearing
might lead to substantial operational cost savings as well as a reduction in marginal power prices in the majority
of the European countries.
16To the Electricity Regulatory Forum it is also regularly referred as the ‘Florence Forum’.
17Baldick, Bushnell, Hobbs and Wolak (2011) argue that ‘the energy sector is now facing an unprecedented
investment challenge driven by the need to connect large amounts of new generation to the electricity networks to
meet climate change targets, while continuing to provide value for money for consumers and security of supply.’
18The 2009 EU directive states that ‘undistorted market prices would provide an incentive for cross-border
interconnections and for investments in new power generation’, compare European Parliament (2009).
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insuﬃcient incentives in liberalized electricity markets to provide generation investment (see for the
‘missing money discussion’, Oren, 2005, Hogan, 2005, Cramton and Stoft, 2006, Joskow, 2007, and
Cramton and Ockenfels, 2011). Till date, this debate has entirely abstracted from issues arising
due to the presence of transmission networks. As we show, in a system with sequential market
clearing, investment incentives turn out to be higher than in systems with simultaneous market
clearing. As a central message of our findings, policy makers should thus be aware that switching
from a system of sequential market clearing to a system of simultaneous market clearing probably
has a negative impact on firms’ investment incentives. This in turn aggravates the investment
problems identified in the literature on missing money, leading to an increased need for adequate
measures to overcome these problems.
As pointed out throughout our analysis, the investment outcome closely depends on the structure
of transmission financing. So far our analysis of sequential market clearing has only considered
a linear transmission fee. However, in some electricity markets non-linear elements in the trans-
mission fee can be found. The eﬀect of such non-linearities critically depends on their specific
structure. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the impact of two common non-linearities
in the transmission fee.
First, the transmission fee is raised as a lump sum payment per generator.19 Then the eﬀect on
total generation and transmission investment is even stronger compared to a linear transmission
tariﬀ. However, investment in baseload capacity is undistorted. With a lump sum transmission
fee, no spot market distortion occurs and generation scarcity rents are even larger. Hence, more
investment takes place in generation capacity and also the transmission line. Notice that over-
investment in transmission capacity always occurs, that is even for t > k. Baseload investment
takes place eﬃciently again, as long as the lump sum fee is levied on generators regardless of the
generation technology used.
Second, the transmission fee can be conditioned on the spot market outcome.20 In such a system,
the transmission fee is calculated on the basis of the generators’ individual contribution to market
output during demand peak. This implies that the transmission fee is implicitly conditioned on
the spot market realization ✓. If the transmission fee is perfectly set, the net revenue a generator
receives, that is, the market price minus the transmission fee, is equal to the outcome of a sys-
tem with simultaneous market clearing. Hence, such a system can lead to the socially optimal
investment outcome.
19This might be the case when the transmission fee is levied on generators in a way uncorrelated to the system
demand. This is, for example, the case with a fee for network connection as the sole source of transmission financing.
20E.g., in the British electricity market, one element in the calculation of the transmission fee (i.e., the Transmis-
sion Network Use of System or TNUoS charges) is based on the so called ‘triad demand’. According to National
Grid ‘Triad Demand is measured as the average demand on the system over three half hours between November
and February (inclusive) in a financial year. These three half hours comprise the half hour of system demand
peak and the two other half hours of highest system demand which are separated from system demand peak
and each other by at least ten days.’ (see http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/SYS/glossary/#tri and
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/Trans/ElecTransPolicy/Charging/Pages/Charging.aspx)
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6 Extensions
Expensive Transmission. Our analysis so far was based on the assumption t < k. This as-
sumption implies that the transmission capacity matches the generation capacity under sequential
market clearing. If we relax this assumption, the transmission capacity can also be smaller than
the generation capacity, L˜ < X˜. Nevertheless, all results established in Lemmata 1 and 2 and
proposition 1 (i) and (ii) remain valid. While our results with respect to generation investment do
not change, there is not necessarily overinvestment in transmission capacity. The regulator faces
two eﬀects when deciding how much transmission capacity to build, that is, a sunk cost eﬀect and
a spot market distortion eﬀect. The sunk cost eﬀect captures the fact that generation investment
does not depend on the available transmission capacity under sequential market clearing. When
expanding transmission capacity, the regulator does not have to take the additional cost of gen-
eration investment into account as it is already sunk. The spot market distortion eﬀect captures
the distortion at the spot market caused by the transmission fee and is detrimental to the sunk
cost eﬀect. Technically, the eﬀects are derived by subtracting the first-order conditions describing
transmission investment under both investment regimes. This is,
SequentialMarketClearingz }| {ˆ ✓
✓L⌧
⇣
P
⇣
L˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)  t 
SimultaneousMarketClearingz }| {ˆ ✓
✓L
⇣
P
⇣
L˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)  (k + t)
=  
ˆ ✓L⌧
✓L
⇣
P
⇣
L˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)| {z }
spotmarket distortion effect
+ k|{z}
sunk cost effect
.
Notice that both eﬀects are independent from each other. Hence, one or the other eﬀect can be
larger. If the sunk cost eﬀect exceeds the spot market distortion eﬀect, the transmission capacity is
smaller than under simultaneous market clearing
⇣
L˜ < Lˆ
⌘
, otherwise it is larger
⇣
L˜ > Lˆ
⌘
. Notice
that the sunk cost eﬀect is clearly larger than the spot market distortion eﬀect for t < k, and
hence, overinvestment in transmission capacity
⇣
L˜ > Lˆ
⌘
occurs.
Complex Networks. In this section, we show that our results from section 4 for a two-node
network can be easily generalized to more complex networks. In principle, our findings hold for
any star-network with an arbitrarily large number of nodes. An example for such a network
with n nodes is presented in Figure 3. We illustrate this generalization in the simplest possible
star-network with one demand and two supply nodes.21 We assume that the cost of transmission
21Since the use of diﬀerent generation technologies is often restricted to certain geographical locations or nodes
in the network, we consider a situation, where all the baseload generation is located at one of the two supply nodes,
while all the peakload generation is located at the other supply node. Wind turbines or solar panels can only be
used at suﬃciently windy or sunny locations, gas-fired power plants require access to a gas pipeline, lignite-, coal-
and nuclear-fired plants need access to large quantities of water. Moreover, the transport of lignite and coal is
rather costly, so that access to transport facilities is required and the location of nuclear-fired plants has to fulfill
certain safety regulations.
16
Figure 3: n-node star network
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investment t is identical for both transmission lines. Moreover, we denote the capacity of the
transmission line connecting the ‘baseload node’ with the demand node by L1 and the sum of
transmission line capacities by L. The capacity of the transmission line connecting the ‘peakload
node’ with the demand node is given by L   L1 = L0. Thus, the only diﬀerence between the
three-node network and the two-node network lies in the fact that the baseload generators are
connected to the demand node via a separate line, where congestion can occur independently of
the peakload line. In the subsequent analysis we focus on why this is irrelevant and does not
change our results.
With simultaneous market clearing - as before -, both transmission line capacities exactly match the
generation capacities at the respective supply nodes
⇣
Lˆ = Xˆ, Lˆ1 = Xˆ1
⌘
. Moreover, though both
generation technologies are connected via diﬀerent transmission lines, which can be congested
independently from each other, baseload investment can again be expressed as a replacement
trade-oﬀ independent from the cost of transmission. In other words, under simultaneous market
clearing, the contribution of a generation unit to transmission financing is independent of the
generation technology used. Replacing a peakload unit with a baseload unit makes additional
baseload transmission capacity necessary. However, the same amount of transmission capacity
becomes superfluous at the peakload node. Hence, the total transmission capacity in the network
remains unchanged. Notice that in equilibrium the marginal value of transmission has to be equal
for both lines as the marginal cost of transmission investment t is the same for both lines. This
implies that both transmission lines are built such that the resulting total scarcity rents at each line
times the probability of congestion are identical. Since the total scarcity rents from the baseload
technology are higher than those from the peakload technology, it has to hold that the baseload
line is less often congested relative to the peakload line.
The following remark compares the investment performance under simultaneous market clearing
with the socially optimal investment outcome which is denoted by (X⇤, X⇤1 , L⇤, L⇤1).
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Remark 2 [Generation and Transmission Investment - Simultaneous Market Clearing] The solu-
tion obtained under a system with simultaneous market clearing gives rise to the socially optimal
investment in the base load technology
⇣
Xˆ1 = X⇤1
⌘
, in total generation investment
⇣
Xˆ = X⇤
⌘
as
well as in the transmission lines
⇣
Lˆ = L⇤, Lˆ1 = L⇤1
⌘
.
This remark resembles the result stated in remark 1. Hence, simultaneous market clearing also
gives eﬃcient investment signals in more complex star-networks.
With sequential market clearing, again, both transmission line capacities exactly match the gen-
eration capacities at the respective supply nodes
⇣
L˜ = X˜, L˜1 = X˜1
⌘
. However, as in a two-node
network, the subsequently built generation capacity does not depend on the existence of the trans-
mission capacity. Hence, the size of the transmission lines is solely determined by the generation
capacity. This implies that the marginal value of transmission capacity is not necessarily equal
among both transmission lines as it was the case under simultaneous market clearing. In the follow-
ing, we state our main result for the three-node network, which compares industry investment in
generation and optimal transmission investment under sequential market clearing with investment
under simultaneous market clearing.
Proposition 2 [Generation and Transmission Investment - Star Network] If demand is inelastic,
|⌘|  1, the solution obtained under a system with sequential market clearing in a star-network
with 3 nodes gives rise to the identical investment outcome as described in Proposition 1. That
is, sequential market clearing leads to (i) higher total investment, X˜ > Xˆ, (ii) lower investment
in baseload generation capacity, X˜1 < Xˆ1, as well as (iii) higher transmission capacity, L˜ > Lˆ,
compared to investment under simultaneous market clearing.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition supports the results in Proposition 1 for the two-node network and shows that
our findings from Section 4 can be easily generalized to more complex star-networks.
7 Conclusion
Market design is important in network industries as potential congestion between diﬀerent locations
can create a significant barrier to trade. In this regard, there are two competing approaches:
Either, the whole network is designed as a single market with only one price, where potential
network congestion is treated through an alternative mechanism outside the market, or diﬀerent
prices are introduced at diﬀerent locations, which can take potential congestion into account. A
prominent example for such a problem is given by the management of transmission capacity in
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liberalized electricity markets. In the U.S. most markets already implemented simultaneous market
clearing, but in Europe sequential market clearing is still used in the vast majority of electricity
markets. However, the rapid replacement of old carbon intense power plants by new and low
carbon generation puts the transmission grid under pressure. Old and new generation facilities are
typically not located at the same production site. This is because diﬀerent production technologies
often have diﬀerent locational requirements. That is, e.g., gas-fired power plants need access to
gas pipelines, while wind turbines are only eﬃcient to use in windy areas. This creates the need
for an eﬃcient utilization of the existing transmission capacity. While many contributions exist
on the short run eﬀects on transmission management, experts and policymakers have highlighted
the need for the proper long run investment incentives in generation and transmission capacity
for the eﬃcient functioning of the electricity sector. This paper sheds light on the long run
eﬀects of diﬀerent transmission management rules by introducing a network model with endogenous
generation and transmission capacities. We analyze the impact of two regularly used market designs
- simultaneous and sequential market clearing - on generation and transmission capacities as well
as on the generation technology mix in the market.
First, we find that simultaneous market clearing leads to the socially optimal generation and
transmission capacity as well as to the optimal technology mix. This confirms results from the
previous literature (see, for example, Joskow and Tirole (2005)).
Second, we find that sequential market clearing leads to overinvestment in total generation and
transmission capacity. Sequential market clearing disentangles the price signal from the location
of production and hence, from its locational marginal value. This leads to exaggerated investment
incentives.
Third, we find that under sequential market clearing the technology mix is distorted, that is,
overinvestment in peakload capacity and underinvestment in baseload capacity takes place. This is
because baseload generators contribute more to financing the transmission network than peakload
generators and hence, investment in baseload becomes less lucrative.
The central message of our findings is that policy makers should be aware that switching from a
system of sequential market clearing to a system of simultaneous market clearing has a negative
impact on firms’ investment incentives. This in turn aggravates potential investment problems
stemming from market imperfections and institutional constraints in electricity markets, which
have been identified in the literature on missing money. This might lead to an increased need for
adequate measures to overcome those problems.
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Appendix
A Preliminary definitions
(I) Feasible capacity.   describes the feasible capacity and  1 describes the feasible baseload
capacity in the market. It is given by
  =
(
X,
L,
if X  L
if X > L
,  1 =
(
X1,
L,
if X1  L
if X1 > L
.
The feasible peakload capacity is given by     1.
(II) Spot market definitions. The diﬀerent critical spot market realizations are defined as
follows.
✓X1 : P
 
X1, ✓X1
   c1 = 0, ✓X1⌧ : P ⇣X1, ✓X1⌧ ⌘  (c1 + ⌧) = 0
✓X1 : P
⇣
X1, ✓X1
⌘
  c = 0, ✓X1⌧ : P
⇣
X1, ✓X1⌧
⌘
  (c1 + ⌧) = 0
✓X : P
 
X, ✓X
   c = 0, ✓X⌧ : P  X, ✓X⌧    (c1 + ⌧) = 0
✓L : P
 
L, ✓L
   c = 0, ✓L⌧ : P  L, ✓L⌧    (c1 + ⌧) = 0
✓M1 : P
 
 1, ✓M1
   c1 = 0, ✓⌧ : P (0, ✓⌧ )  (c1 + ⌧) = 0
✓M1 : P
⇣
 1, ✓M1
⌘
  c = 0, ✓M : P   , ✓M   c = 0
Remember that the actual size T of the transmission line diﬀers from the nominal size L. The
frequency of the capacity is denoted by g (T ), its support is given by [ ✏,+✏], and its cumulative
distribution is denoted by G (T ). If the size of the transmission and generation capacities is
suﬃciently diﬀerent, that is, | X   L |> ✏, the former (latter) is larger (smaller) with probability
1 (0). However, if transmission and generation capacities are suﬃciently close, the uncertainty of
the transmission line also aﬀects the relative size of the generation and transmission capacities.
G (.) is the probability that the transmission line is binding before the generation capacity is and
1   G (.) is the probability that the generation capacity is binding before the transmission line is
doing so. Formally, we assign the following probabilities
G (X   L) =
8>><>>:
0,
1,
(0, 1) ,
if L X > ✏
if X   L > ✏
otherwise
(III) Spot market profits and welfare under simultaneous market clearing. In this
section we present the profits of generators and transmission owners as well as welfare for diﬀerent
spot markets. W (X,X1, L, ✓) denotes the economy’s welfare and ⇡i (x, x1, l, ✓) the profit of a
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generator.
• at spot markets ✓✏ ⇥✓, ✓M1⇤
W (X,X1, L, ✓) =
ˆ Q
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv
⇡ (x, x1, l, ✓) = 0
• at spot markets ✓✏
h
✓M1 , ✓M1
i
W (X,X1, L, ✓) = (1 G (X1   L))
ˆ X1
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv +G (X1   L)
ˆ L
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv
⇡ (x, x1, l, ✓) = (1 G (X1   L)) (P (X1, ✓)  c1)x1
• at spot markets ✓✏
h
✓M1 , ✓M
i
W (X,X1, L, ✓) = (1 G (X1 +Q  L))
 ˆ X1+Q
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1
0
c1dv  
ˆ X1+Q
X1
cdv
!
+G (X1 +Q  L)
 ˆ L
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1
0
c1dv  
ˆ L
X1
cdv
!
⇡ (x, x1, l, ✓) = (1 G (X1 +Q  L)) (P (X1 +Q, ✓)  c1)x1 +G (X1 +Q  L) (c  c1)x1
• at spot markets ✓✏ ⇥✓M , ✓⇤
W (X,X1, L, ✓) = (1 G (X   L))
 ˆ X
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1
0
c1dv  
ˆ X
X1
cdv
!
+G (X   L)
 ˆ L
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1
0
c1dv  
ˆ L
X1
cdv
!
⇡ (x, x1, l, ✓) = (1 G (X   L)) ((P (X, ✓)  c1)x1 + (P (X, ✓)  c) (x  x1))
+G ((X   L)) (c  c1)x1
(IV ) Spot market profits and welfare under sequential market clearing. In this section
we present the profits of generators and transmission owners as well as welfare for diﬀerent spot
markets. W (X,X1, L, ✓) denotes the economy’s welfare and ⇡i (x, x1, l, ✓) the profit of a generator
at spot market realization ✓. Notice that welfare under sequential market clearing only diﬀers from
welfare in simultaneous market clearing as the generators’ choice variablesQ (⌧ (L)), X1 (⌧ (L)) and
X (⌧ (L)) are now depending on the transmission fee (⌧ (L)) which has to be taken into account.
In addition, the critical spot market realizations are also aﬀected by the transmission fee.
• at spot markets ✓✏
h
✓, ✓
M1
⌧
i
W (X,X1, L, ✓) =
ˆ Q(⌧(L))
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv
⇡ (x, x1, l, ✓) = 0
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• at spot markets ✓✏
h
✓
M1
⌧ , ✓M1⌧
i
W (X,X1, L, ✓) = (1 G (X1   L))
ˆ X1(⌧(L))
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv +G (X1   L)
ˆ L
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv
⇡ (x, x1, l, ✓) = (P (X1, ✓)  c1)x1
• at spot markets ✓✏
h
✓M1⌧ , ✓
M
⌧
i
W (X,X1, L, ✓) = (1 G (X1 +Q  L))
 ˆ X1(⌧(L))+Q(⌧(L))
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1(⌧(L))
0
c1dv  
ˆ X1(⌧(L))+Q(⌧(L))
X1(⌧(L))
cdv
!
+G (X1 +Q  L)
 ˆ L
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1(⌧(L))
0
c1dv  
ˆ L
X1(⌧(L))
cdv
!
⇡ (x, x1, l, ✓) = (P (X1 +Q, ✓)  c1)x1
• at spot markets ✓✏ ⇥✓M⌧ , ✓⇤
W (X,X1, L, ✓) = (1 G (X   L))
 ˆ X(⌧(L))
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1(⌧(L))
0
c1dv  
ˆ X(⌧(L))
X1(⌧(L))
cdv
!
+G (X   L)
 ˆ L
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1(⌧(L))
0
c1dv  
ˆ L
X1(⌧(L))
cdv
!
⇡ (x, x1, l, ✓) = (P (X, ✓)  c1)x1 + (P (X, ✓)  c) (x  x1)
B Proof of remark 1
(I) Welfare and first order conditions. The previous results enable us to derive overall welfare.
It is obtained by the integral over all spot markets.
W (X,X1, L) =
ˆ ✓
✓
W (X,X1, L, ✓) dF (✓)  k1x1   k (x  x1)  tl
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Note that the integrand in this expression is continuous in ✓. The first derivatives are given by:
WX = (1 G (X   L))
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (X, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  k
WX1 = (1 G (X1   L))
ˆ ✓M1
✓M1
(P (X1, ✓)  c1) dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓M
✓M1
(P (X1 +Q, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)
+
ˆ ✓
✓M
(c  c1) dF (✓)  (k   k1)
WL = G (X1   L)
ˆ ✓M1
✓M1
(P (L, ✓)  c1) dF (✓) +G (X1 +Q  L)
ˆ ✓M
✓M1
(P (L, ✓)  c) dF (✓)
+G (X   L)
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (L, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  t
(II) Equilibrium. In equilibrium the first derivatives have to be equal to zero. Hence, the
transmission line and total generation capacity have to be of the same size:
X⇤ = L⇤
This is
WX (X
⇤, X⇤1 , L
⇤) +WL (X⇤, X⇤1 , L
⇤) =
ˆ ✓
✓X
(P (X⇤, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  (k + t) = 0 (1)
WX1 (X
⇤, X⇤1 , L
⇤) =
ˆ ✓X1
✓X1
(P (X⇤1 , ✓)  c1) dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓
✓X1
(c  c1) dF (✓)  (k1   k) = 0(2)
(III) Uniqueness. As in equilibrium X⇤ = L⇤ has to hold, it is suﬃcient to check the second
order conditions only for the joint equilibrium conditions from (II) with respect to X and X1.
The second derivatives are given by
WXX (X
⇤, X⇤1 , L
⇤) +WLL (X⇤, X⇤1 , L
⇤) =
ˆ ✓
✓X
Pq (X
⇤, ✓) dF (✓) < 0
WX1X1 (X
⇤, X⇤1 , L
⇤) =
ˆ ✓X1
✓X1
Pq (X
⇤
1 , ✓) +
ˆ ✓X
✓X1
Pq (X
⇤
1 +Q, ✓) < 0
WXX1 (X
⇤, X⇤1 , L
⇤) = 0
It is easy to see that the absolute value of the cross derivatives is smaller than the absolute value
of any of the second derivatives
| Wxx (X,X1, L) |, | Wx1x1 (X,X1, L) |>| Wxx1 (X,X1, L) |
Hence, the product of the cross derivatives is smaller than the product of the second derivatives:
⇡xx (X,X1, L) · ⇡x1x1 (X,X1, L) > 0
That is, the first order conditions describe a unique equilibrium.
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C Proof of Lemma 1
(I) Preliminaries: Profits and first order conditions. The results for the spot market
equilibria enable us to derive the investors’ overall profits. It is obtained by the integral over all
spot markets. For generators this is given by:
⇡i (x, x1, l) =
ˆ ✓
✓
⇡i (x, x1, l, ✓) dF (✓)  k1x1   k (x  x1) (3)
Note that the integrand in this expression is continuous in ✓. The first derivatives are given by:
⇡x = (1 G (X   L))
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (X, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  k
⇡x1 = (1 G (X1   L))
ˆ ✓M1
✓M1
(P (X1, ✓)  c1) dF (✓) + (1 G (X1 +Q  L))
ˆ ✓M
✓M1
(P (X1 +Q, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)
+G (X1 +Q  L)
ˆ ✓M
✓M1
(c  c1) dF (✓)  (k1   k)
The first derivative with respect to the optimal transmission line is already given in the proof of 1:
WL = G (X1   L)
ˆ ✓M1
✓M1
(P (L, ✓)  c1) dF (✓) +G (X1 +Q  L)
ˆ ✓M
✓M1
(P (L, ✓)  c) dF (✓)
+G (X   L)
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (L, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  t
(II) Equilibrium. The equilibrium equates the first derivatives to zero. Hence, in equilibrium,
transmission and generation capacity have to be of equal size:
Xˆ = Lˆ
This is
⇡X =
⇣
1 G
⇣
Xˆ   Lˆ
⌘⌘ ˆ ✓
✓X
⇣
P
⇣
Xˆ, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)  k = 0 (4)
⇡X1 =
ˆ ✓X1
✓X1
⇣
P
⇣
Xˆ1, ✓
⌘
  c1
⌘
dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓
✓X1
(c  c1) dF (✓)  (k1   k) = 0 (5)
WL = G
⇣
Xˆ   Lˆ
⌘ ˆ ✓
✓X
⇣
P
⇣
Lˆ, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)  t = 0 (6)
Comparing equations (4), (5) and (6) with the first order conditions of the socially optimal invest-
ment (1) and (2), it is straightforward to see that investment under simultaneous market clearing
leads to the socially optimal investment outcome.
(III) Uniqueness. As the first oder conditions are identical to the first order conditions charac-
terizing the socially optimal investment (remark 1). As we have shown, these characterize a unique
equilibrium. Hence, also the first order conditions under (II) do.
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D Proof of Lemma 2
D.1 Preliminaries: Balanced Budget
We assume that the regulator has to fulfill the following budget balancing equation:
BB :  tL  ´ ✓X⌧✓L⌧
´ Q⇤(⌧(L),✓)
L (P (L, ✓)  c  ⌧ (L)) dydF (✓) 
´ ✓
✓X⌧
´X(⌧(L))
L (P (L, ✓)  c  ⌧ (L)) dydF (✓)
+
´ ✓X1⌧
✓⌧ Q
⌧ (⌧ (L) , ✓) ⌧ (L) dF (✓) +
´ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
X1 (⌧ (L)) ⌧ (L) dF (✓) +
´ ✓L⌧
✓
X1
⌧
(X1 (⌧ (L)) +Q⇤ (⌧ (L))) ⌧ (L) dF (✓)
+
´ ✓¯
✓L⌧
L⌧ (L) dF (✓) = 0
(7)
This equation implies that the revenues from the transmission fee are identical to the expenditures
for the investment cost as well as the cost to run the adjustment market.
D.2 Market generation investment
(I) Preliminaries: Profits and first order conditions. The results for the spot market
equilibria enable us to derive the investors’ overall profits. It is obtained by the integral over all
spot markets. For generators this is given by:
⇡i
 
xB , xP , l
 
=
ˆ ✓
✓
⇡i
 
xB , xP , l, ✓
 
dF (✓)  k1x1   k (x  x1) (8)
Note that the integrand in this expression is continuous in ✓. The first derivatives are given by:
⇡x (x, x1, l) =
ˆ ✓
✓X⌧
(P (X, ✓)  ⌧   c) dF (✓)  k
⇡x1 (x, x1, l) =
ˆ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
(P (X1, ✓)  ⌧   c1) dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓X⌧
✓
X1
⌧
(P (X1 +Q, ✓)  ⌧   c1) dF (✓)
+
ˆ ✓
✓X⌧
(c  c1) dF (✓)  (k1   k)
(II) Equilibrium. The equilibrium equates the first derivatives to zero. This is
X˜ :
ˆ ✓
✓X⌧
⇣
P
⇣
X˜, ✓
⌘
  ⌧   c
⌘
dF (✓)  k = 0 (9)
X˜1 :
ˆ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
⇣
P
⇣
X˜1, ✓
⌘
  ⌧   c1
⌘
dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓
✓
X1
⌧
(c  c1) dF (✓)  (k1   k) = 0 (10)
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(III) Uniqueness. The second derivatives are given by
⇡x1x1 (x, x1, l) =
ˆ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
2Pq
⇣
X˜1, ✓
⌘
dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓X⌧
✓
X1
⌧
2Pq
⇣
X˜1 +Q, ✓
⌘
dF (✓) < 0
⇡xx (x, x1, l) =
ˆ ✓
✓X⌧
2Pq
⇣
X˜, ✓
⌘
dF (✓) < 0
⇡xx1 (x, x1, l) = 0
As is easy to see, the absolute value of the cross derivatives is smaller than the absolute value of
any of the second derivatives and hence, the product of the cross derivatives is smaller than the
product of the second derivatives
| ⇡xx1 (x, x1, l) |<| ⇡xx (x, x1, l) |, | ⇡x1x1 (x, x1, l) |
⇡xx (x, x1, l) · ⇡x1x1 (x, x1, l) > 0.
That is, the first order conditions describe a unique equilibrium.
D.3 Optimal transmission line investment
(I) Welfare. The results for the spot market welfare enable us to derive the investors’ overall
profits. It is obtained by the integral over all spot markets. Welfare is given by
W (X,X1, L) =
ˆ ✓
✓
W (X,X1, L, ✓) dF (✓)  k (X (⌧ (L)) X1 (⌧ (L)))  k1X1 (⌧ (L))  tL (11)
Taking the first derivative and rearranging gives:
WL =
ˆ ✓X1⌧
✓
⌧ (L)Q⇤⌧ (⌧ (L)) ⌧L (L) dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
(P (X1 (⌧ (L)) , ✓)  c1)X1⌧ (⌧ (L)) ⌧L (L) dF (✓)
+
ˆ ✓L⌧
✓
X1
⌧
⌧ (L) (X1⌧ (⌧ (L)) +Q
⇤
⌧ (⌧ (L))) ⌧L (L) dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓¯
✓
X1
⌧
(c  c1)X1⌧ (⌧ (L)) ⌧L (L) dF (✓)
+
ˆ ✓¯
✓L⌧
(P (L, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  kX⌧ (⌧ (L)) ⌧L (L)  (k1   k)X1⌧ (⌧ (L)) ⌧L (L)  t
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(II) Balanced Budget. Taking the first derivative of the budget balancing equation and rear-
ranging gives
BBL =
´ ✓X1⌧
✓⌧ ⌧ (L)Q
⌧
⌧ (⌧ (L) , ✓) ⌧L (L) dF (✓) +
´ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
⌧ (L)X1⌧ (⌧ (L)) ⌧L (L) dF (✓)
+
´ ✓L⌧
✓
X1
⌧
⌧ (L) (X1⌧ (⌧ (L)) +Q⇤⌧ (⌧ (L))) ⌧L (L) dF (✓) +
´ ✓¯
✓L⌧
(P (L, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  kX⌧ (⌧ (L)) ⌧L (L) dF (✓)  t
  ´ ✓X⌧✓L⌧ (P (L, ✓)  c  ⌧ (L))Q⇤⌧ (⌧ (L) , ✓) ⌧L (L) dF (✓) 
´ ✓
✓X⌧
(P (L, ✓)  P (X, ✓))X⌧ (⌧ (L)) dF (✓)
+
´ ✓X⌧
✓L⌧
Q⇤ (⌧ (L) , ✓) ⌧L (L) dF (✓) +
´ ✓
✓X⌧
X (⌧ (L)) ⌧L (L) dF (✓) +
´ ✓X1⌧
✓⌧ Q
⌧ (⌧ (L) , ✓) ⌧L (L) dF (✓)
+
´ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
X1 (⌧ (L)) ⌧L (L) dF (✓) +
´ ✓L⌧
✓
X1
⌧
(X1 (⌧ (L)) +Q⇤ (⌧ (L))) ⌧L (L) dF (✓) = 0
(12)
We can now substitute BBL into WL:
WL =  ⌧L (L)
⇣
  ´ ✓X⌧✓L⌧ (P (L, ✓)  c  ⌧ (L))Q⇤⌧ (⌧ (L) , ✓) dF (✓) 
´ ✓
✓X⌧
(P (L, ✓)  P (X, ✓))X⌧ (⌧ (L)) dF (✓)
⌘
 ⌧L (L)
✓´ ✓X⌧
✓L⌧
Q⇤ (⌧ (L) , ✓) dF (✓) +
´ ✓
✓X⌧
X (⌧ (L) , ✓) dF (✓) +
´ ✓X1⌧
✓⌧ Q
⇤ (⌧ (L) , ✓) dF (✓)
◆
 ⌧L (L)
✓´ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
X1 (⌧ (L)) dF (✓) +
´ ✓L⌧
✓
X1
⌧
(X1 (⌧ (L)) +Q⇤ (⌧ (L))) dF (✓)
◆
As all elements within the brackets are positive, the whole term is also positive. If we determine
the sign of ⌧L, we know the sign of WL. ⌧L is given by
⌧L =
⇣
t  ´ ✓✓L⌧ (P (L, ✓)  c) dF (✓)
⌘✓ ´ ✓X⌧
✓L⌧
Q⇤ (⌧ (L) , ✓) dF (✓) +
´ ✓
✓X⌧
X (⌧ (L)) dF (✓)
+
´ ✓L⌧
✓
X1
⌧
((X1⌧ (⌧ (L)) +Q⇤⌧ (⌧ (L))) ⌧ (L) + (X1 (⌧ (L)) +Q⇤ (⌧ (L)))) dF (✓)
+
´ ✓X1⌧
✓⌧ (Q
⌧
⌧ (⌧ (L) , ✓) ⌧ (L) +Q
⌧ (⌧ (L) , ✓)) dF (✓) +
´ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
(X1⌧ (⌧ (L)) ⌧ (L) +X1 (⌧ (L))) dF (✓)
  ´ ✓X⌧✓L⌧ ((P (L, ✓)  c  ⌧ (L))Q⇤⌧ (⌧ (L) , ✓)) dF (✓) 
´ ✓
✓X⌧
(P (L, ✓)  c  ⌧ (L))X⌧ (⌧ (L)) dF (✓)
◆ 1
Note that the second term is positive for ⌘    1. Hence, the sign of ⌧L only depends on the first
term of the equation, that is,
⌧L = sign
 
t 
ˆ ✓
✓L⌧
(P (L, ✓)  c) dF (✓)
!
, (13)
which, thus, describes the size of the transmission line. In order to evaluate the size of transmission
capacity relative to the generation stock, we subtract the first order condition describing generation
investment (expression (9)) from expression (13).
ˆ ✓
✓L⌧
⇣
P
⇣
L˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)  t 
ˆ ✓
✓X⌧
⇣
P
⇣
X˜, ✓
⌘
  ⌧   c
⌘
dF (✓) + k ? 0
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We get:
(i) t  k +  1  F  ✓X⌧    ⌧ ) ⌧L  0: The transmission line matches the generation capacity (corner
solution).
(ii) t > k +
 
1  F  ✓X⌧    ⌧ ) ⌧L > 0: The transmission line does not match the generation capacity
(interior solution).
Hence, given our assumption t < k on the transmission line, (i) always holds, that is, the line
capacity matches the generation capacity, that is, X˜ = L˜. Q.e.d.
E Proof of Proposition 1
This proposition compares the investment incentives under sequential market clearing with the
investment incentives under simultaneous market clearing. In order to show whether under se-
quential market clearing investment incentives are stronger or weaker, it is suﬃcient to subtract
the respective equilibrium conditions from each other. We start with total capacity:
E.1 Total Generation Capacity
We evaluate the diﬀerence between the first derivatives describing total capacity under sequential
market clearing (expression (9)) and under simultaneous market clearing (expression (4)) evaluated
at the sequential market clearing equilibrium values, X = L.
ˆ ✓¯
✓X⌧
⇣
P
⇣
X˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓) 
ˆ ✓¯
✓X⌧
⌧dF (✓)  k
 
ˆ ✓¯
✓X
⇣
P
⇣
X˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓) + (k + t) ? 0
Reformulating yields the following expression:
ˆ ✓X
✓
Q⌧
L˜
dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓X⌧
✓X
0@Q⌧
L˜
 
P
⇣
L˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌧
1A dF (✓)
The first term is clearly positive, if the second term is also positive, the whole expression is
positive and hence, total capacity under sequential market clearing exceeds total capacity under
simultaneous market clearing. The second term can be rewritten as
1
L⌧
ˆ ✓X⌧
✓X
0BBBB@
ˆ ⌧
0
Q⌧ (v, ✓)
0BBB@@Q⌧ (v, ✓)@⌧ vQ⌧ (v, ✓)| {z }
=⌘⌧
+1
1CCCA dv  
ˆ L
0
P (v, ✓)
0BBBB@@P (v, ✓)@L vP (v, ✓)| {z }
=⌘ 1L
+
P (v, ✓)  c
P (v, ✓)| {z }
✏[0,1]
1CCCCA dv
1CCCCA dF (✓) .
This expression is positive, if ⌘    1. Q.e.d.
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E.2 Baseload Generation Capacity
Again, we evaluate the diﬀerence between the first order conditions describing baseload capac-
ity under sequential market clearing (expression (10)) and under simultaneous market clearing
(expression (5)) evaluated at the equilibrium value under sequential market clearing, X˜1.
ˆ ✓X1⌧
✓
X1
⌧
⇣
P
⇣
X˜1, ✓
⌘
  ⌧   c1
⌘
dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓¯
✓
X1
⌧
(c  c1) dF (✓)  (k1   k)
 
ˆ ✓X1
✓X1
⇣
P
⇣
X˜1, ✓
⌘
  c1
⌘
dF (✓) 
ˆ ✓¯
✓X1
(c  c1) dF (✓) + (k1   k) ? 0
Reformulating yields the following expression, which is weakly negative.
,
ˆ ✓X1⌧
✓X1
⇣
P
⇣
X˜1, ✓
⌘
  ⌧   c
⌘
dF (✓)| {z }
0
 
ˆ ✓X1⌧
✓X1
⇣
P
⇣
X˜1, ✓
⌘
  c1
⌘
dF (✓) 
ˆ ✓X1
✓
X1
⌧
⌧dF (✓)  0
Hence, under sequential market clearing, baseload capacity is below the level reached with simul-
taneous market clearing.
E.3 Transmission Capacity
From the proof in Subsection D.3 we know that for our assumption t < k the transmission capacity
always matches the generation capacity, that is, X˜ = L˜. Moreover, it has also been shown in
Subsection E.1 that the generation capacity with sequential market clearing exceeds the generation
capacity with simultaneous market clearing, X˜ > Xˆ. Hence, it holds that L˜ > Lˆ. Q.e.d.
However, if we allow for t > k, X˜ = L˜ does not necessarily hold. In order to understand how this
influences our result with respect to the transmission capacity, we again evaluate the diﬀerence
between the first order conditions describing transmission capacity under sequential market clear-
ing (expression. (13)) and under simultaneous market clearing (expression (6)) evaluated at the
sequential market clearing equilibrium value L˜.
First-best line investment is given by
ˆ ✓
✓L
⇣
P
⇣
Lˆ, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)  (k + t) = 0
Optimal investment under sequential market clearing is given by,
ˆ ✓
✓L⌧
⇣
P
⇣
L˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)  t = 0
Subtracting from each other and evaluating at the eq. values under sequential market clearing:
SequentialMarketClearingz }| {ˆ ✓
✓L⌧
⇣
P
⇣
L˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)  t 
SimultaneousMarketClearingz }| {ˆ ✓
✓L
⇣
P
⇣
L˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)  (k + t)
=  
ˆ ✓L⌧
✓L
⇣
P
⇣
L˜, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)| {z }
spotmarket distortion effect
+ k|{z}
sunk cost effect
.
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If the equation above is greater than zero, it holds that X˜ > Xˆ. If it is smaller than zero, the
opposite is true, that is X˜ < Xˆ. Notice that the first and the second term of the equation are
independent of each other. Hence, for k large enough - everything else equal - the former holds,
otherwise the latter is true.
F Generalization
F.1 Preliminary definitions
(I) Definitions. For tractability, we now explicitly express the peakload capacity, that is, L L1 =
L0 and X  X1 = X0 and     1 =  0 with
 1 =
(
X1,
L1,
if X1  L1
if X1 > L1
,  0 =
(
X0,
L0,
if X0  L0
if X0 > L0
.
As with the two-node network, the actual size of the transmission lines T1 resp. T0 diﬀers from
their nominal size L1 resp. L0. The frequencies, the support and the cdf are denoted and given
just as in the two-node network. However, notice that the uncertainties are independent among
lines.
(II) Spot market profits and welfare under simultaneous market clearing. In this section
we present the profits of generators and transmission owners as well as welfare for diﬀerent spot
markets. W (X,X1, L, L1, ✓) denotes the economy’s welfare and ⇡i (x, x1, l, l1, ✓) the profit of a
generator.
• at spot markets ✓✏ ⇥✓, ✓M1⇤
W (X1, X0, L1, L0, ✓) =
ˆ Q
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv
⇡ (x1, x0, l1, l0, ✓) = 0
• at spot markets ✓✏
h
✓M1 , ✓M1
i
W (X1, X0, L1, L0, ✓) = (1 G (X1   L1))
ˆ X1
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv +G (X1   L1)
ˆ L1
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv
⇡ (x1, x0, l1, l0, ✓) = (1 G (X1   L1)) (P (X1, ✓)  c1)x1
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• at spot markets ✓✏
h
✓M1 , ✓M
i
W (X1, X0, L1, L0, ✓) = (1 G (X1   L1))
 ˆ X1+Q
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1
0
c1dv  
ˆ X1+Q
X1
cdv
!
+G (X1   L1)
 ˆ L1+Q
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ L1
0
c1dv  
ˆ L1+Q
L1
cdv
!
⇡ (x1, x0, l1, l0, ✓) = (1 G (X1   L1)) (P (X1 +Q, ✓)  c1)x1
• at spot markets ✓✏ ⇥✓M , ✓⇤
W (X1, X0, L1, L0, ✓) = (1 G (X1   L1)) (1 G (X0   L0))
 ˆ X
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1
0
c1dv  
ˆ X
X1
cdv
!
+G (X1   L1) (1 G (X0   L0))
 ˆ L1+X0
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ L1
0
c1dv  
ˆ L1+X0
L1
cdv
!
+(1 G (X1   L1))G (X0   L0)
 ˆ X1+L0
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1
0
c1dv  
ˆ X1+L0
X1
cdv
!
+G (X1   L1)G (X0   L0)
 ˆ L
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ L1
0
c1dv  
ˆ L
L1
cdv
!
⇡ (x1, x0, l1, l0, ✓) = (1 G (X1   L1)) (1 G (X0   L0)) ((P (X, ✓)  c1)x1 + (P (X, ✓)  c)x0)
+G (X1   L1) (1 G (X0   L0)) (P (X1 + L0, ✓)  c1)x1
+(1 G (X1   L1))G (X0   L0) (P (L1 +X0, ✓)  c)x0.
(III) Spot market profits and welfare under sequential market clearing. In this section
we present the profits of generators and transmission owners as well as welfare for diﬀerent spot
markets. W (X,X1, L, L1, ✓) denotes the economy’s welfare and ⇡i (x, x1, l, l1, ✓) the profit of a
generator. Notice that here we only state the generation spot market profits for X1  L1 and
X0  L0. As is shown below, this is the only relevant case.
• at spot markets ✓✏
h
✓, ✓
M1
⌧
i
W (X,X1, L, L1✓) =
ˆ Q⇤(⌧(L))
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv
⇡ (x, x1, l, ✓) = 0
• at spot markets ✓✏
h
✓
M1
⌧ , ✓M1⌧
i
W (X,X1, L, L1, ✓) =
ˆ X1(⌧(L))
0
(P (v, ✓)  c1) dv
⇡ (x, x1, l, ✓) = (P (X1, ✓)  c1)x1
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• at spot markets ✓✏
h
✓M1⌧ , ✓
M
⌧
i
W (X,X1, L, L1, ✓) =
ˆ X1(⌧(L))+Q⇤(⌧(L))
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1(⌧(L))
0
c1dv  
ˆ Q⇤(⌧(L))
0
cdv
⇡ (x, x1, l, l1, ✓) = (P (X1 +Q, ✓)  c1)x1
• at spot markets ✓✏ ⇥✓M⌧ , ✓⇤
W (X,X1, L, L1, ✓) =
ˆ  
0
P (v, ✓) dv  
ˆ X1(⌧(L))
0
c1dv  
ˆ  
X1(⌧(L))
cdv
⇡ (x, x1, l, l1, ✓) = (P (X, ✓)  c1)x1 + (P (X, ✓)  c) (x  x1)
F.2 Proof of remark 2.
F.2.1 Socially optimal investment
(I) Welfare and first order conditions. The previous results enable us to derive overall welfare.
It is obtained by the integral over all spot markets.
W (X1, X0, L1, L0) =
ˆ ✓
✓
W (X1, X0, L1, L0, ✓) dF (✓)  k1x1   kx0   tl1   tl0 (14)
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Note that the integrand in this expression is continuous in ✓. The first derivatives are given by:
WX1 = (1 G (X1   L1))
ˆ ✓M1
✓M1
(P (X1, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)
+ (1 G (X1   L1))
ˆ ✓M
✓M1
(P (X1 +Q, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)
+ (1 G (X1   L1)) (1 G (X0   L0))
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (X, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)
+ (1 G (X1   L1))G (X0   L0)
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (X1 + L0, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)  k1
WX0 = (1 G (X1   L1)) (1 G (X0   L0))
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (X, ✓)  c) dF (✓)
+G (X1   L1) (1 G (X0   L0))
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (L1 +X0, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  k
WL1 = G (X1   L1)
ˆ ✓M1
✓M1
(P (L1, ✓)  c1) dF (✓) +G (X1   L1)
ˆ ✓M
✓M1
(P (L1 +Q, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)
+G (X1   L1) (1 G (X0   L0))
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (L1 +X0, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)
+G (X1   L1)G (X0   L0)
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (L, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)  t
WL0 = (1 G (X1   L1))G (X0   L0)
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (X1 + L0, ✓)  c) dF (✓)
+G (X1   L1)G (X0   L0)
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (L, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  t
(II) Equilibrium. In equilibrium, the first derivatives have to be equal to zero. Hence, trans-
mission and generation capacity have to be of the equal capacity:
X⇤1 = L⇤1 and X⇤0 = L⇤0
Using X  X1 = X0 and L  L1 = L0, this is
X⇤ :
ˆ ✓¯
✓X
(P (X⇤, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  (k + t) = 0 (15)
X⇤1 :
ˆ ✓X1
✓X1
(P (X⇤1 , ✓)  c1) dF (✓) +
ˆ ✓¯
✓X1
(c  c1) dF (✓)  (k1   k) = 0 (16)
(III) Uniqueness. As in equilibrium X⇤ = L⇤ and X⇤1 = L⇤1 have to hold, it is suﬃcient to check
the second order conditions only for the joint equilibrium conditions from (II) with respect to X
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and X1. The second derivatives are given by
WXX (X,X1, L, L1✓) +WLL (X,X1, L, L1✓) =
ˆ ✓
✓X
Pq (X, ✓) dF (✓) < 0
WX1X1 (X,X1, L, ✓) =
ˆ ✓X1
✓X1
Pq (X1, ✓) +
ˆ ✓X
✓X1
Pq (X1 +Q, ✓) < 0
WXX1 (X,X1, L, ✓) = 0
As is easy to see, the absolute value of the cross derivatives is smaller than the absolute value of
any of the second derivatives
| Wxx (X,X1, L) |, | Wx1x1 (X,X1, L) |>| Wxx1 (X,X1, L) |
Hence, the product of the cross derivatives is smaller than the product of the second derivatives:
⇡xx (X,X1, L) · ⇡x1x1 (X,X1, L) > 0
That is, the first order conditions describe a unique equilibrium.
F.2.2 Investment under simultaneous market clearing
(I) Profits and first order conditions. The previous results enable us to derive overall profits
and welfare. These are obtained by the integral over all spot markets and given by
⇡i (x1, x0, l1, l0) =
ˆ ✓
✓
⇡i (x1, x0, l1, l0, ✓) dF (✓)  k1x1   kx0 (17)
Note that the integrand in this expression is continuous in ✓. The first derivatives for generation
investment are given by:
⇡X1 = (1 G (X1   L1))
ˆ ✓M1
✓M1
(P (X1, ✓)  c1) dF (✓) + (1 G (X1   L1))
ˆ ✓M
✓M1
(P (X1 +Q, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)
+ (1 G (X1   L1)) (1 G (X0   L0))
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (X, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)
+ (1 G (X1   L1))G (X0   L0)
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (X1 + L0, ✓)  c1) dF (✓)  k1
⇡X0 = (1 G (X0   L0)) (1 G (X1   L1))
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (X, ✓)  c) dF (✓)
+ (1 G (X0   L0))G (X1   L1)
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (L1 +X0, ✓)  c) dF (✓)
+G (X0   L0) (1 G (X1   L1))
ˆ ✓
✓M
(P (X1 + L0, ✓)  c) dF (✓)  k
The first order conditions for the socially optimal transmission line investment are identical to
those in Section F.2.1.
(II) Equilibrium. The equilibrium equates the first derivatives to zero. Hence, in equilibrium
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transmission lines and generation have to be of the same capacity:
Xˆ1 = Lˆ1 and Xˆ0 = Lˆ0
This is
⇡X1 =
⇣
1 G
⇣
Xˆ1   Lˆ1
⌘⌘ ˆ ✓M1
✓M1
⇣
P
⇣
Xˆ1, ✓
⌘
  cB
⌘
dF (✓) (18)
+
⇣
1 G
⇣
Xˆ1   Lˆ1
⌘⌘ ˆ ✓M
✓M1
⇣
P
⇣
Xˆ1 +Q, ✓
⌘
  cB
⌘
dF (✓)
+
⇣
1 G
⇣
Xˆ1   Lˆ1
⌘⌘ ˆ ✓
✓M
⇣
P
⇣
Xˆ, ✓
⌘
  c1
⌘
dF (✓)  k1 = 0
⇡X0 = (1 G (X0   L0))
ˆ ✓
✓M
⇣
P
⇣
Xˆ, ✓
⌘
  cP
⌘
dF (✓)  k = 0 (19)
WL1 = G
⇣
Xˆ1   Lˆ1
⌘ ˆ ✓M1
✓M1
⇣
P
⇣
Xˆ1, ✓
⌘
  c1
⌘
dF (✓) +G
⇣
Xˆ1   Lˆ1
⌘ ˆ ✓M
✓M1
(c  c1) dF (✓) (20)
+G
⇣
Xˆ1   Lˆ1
⌘ ˆ ✓
✓M
⇣
P
⇣
Xˆ, ✓
⌘
  c1
⌘
dF (✓)  t
WL0 = G
⇣
Xˆ0   Lˆ0
⌘ ˆ ✓
✓M
⇣
P
⇣
Lˆ, ✓
⌘
  c
⌘
dF (✓)  t = 0 (21)
The sum of conditions (18) and (20) is identical to condition (16) and the sum of conditions (19)
and (21) is identical to condition (15). Hence, under simultaneous market clearing the socially
optimal investment outcome emerges. Q.e.d.
(III) Uniqueness. Conditions (18), (20), (19) and (21) are identical to the conditions describing
the socially optimal investment (eq. (16) and (15)). As we have shown, the later constitutes a
unique equilibrium. Hence, also the first order conditions (18), (19), (20) and (21) do. Q.e.d.
F.3 Proof of Proposition 2.
The generation profit function, the welfare function and the budget balancing equation are identical
to the respective functions in the two-node case (eq. (3), (11) and (7)). Hence, given our assump-
tion t < k on the transmission line, total transmission capacity always matches total generation
capacity, X˜ = L˜. Moreover, the transmission capacity at any line never exceeds the generation
capacity. This implies that L˜1 = X˜1 and L˜0 = X˜0. Hence, the results from the two-node case also
apply here. Q.e.d.
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